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The Actions of the Antitrust Plaintiff: Law, Policy
and a Modest Proposal
Kent S. Bernard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A palpable difference exists between the idealized image of the
treble-damage, antitrust plaintiff-a gleaming surrogate attorney
general, boldly striking terror into the hearts of malefactors-and
the reality; quite often plaintiffs are as tarnished as the antitrust
violator. Judicial belief in the surrogate attorney general concept
has led to the rule that plaintiff's participation in an antitrust violation generally does not prevent him from suing and recovering treble
damages.' The courts will not, however, allow the surrogate attorney
general to steal; thus, an antitrust charge rarely allows the plaintiff
to avoid paying for goods bought from the defendant.'
This article will explore the conceptual bases and effects of these
two rules. Arguably, the courts simply allow each side to recover
damages without regard to its conduct.3 Actually, the rules encourage potential plaintiffs to tolerate antitrust violations temporarily
by offering a windfall gain of treble damages as a reward for their
silence. This incongruous result suggests that something has gone
awry and that a reexamination of the rules and their application is
necessary. It appears, in fact, certain changes should be made if the
antitrust law is to achieve its policy objectives.
A modest proposal for reform is offered. By borrowing the idea of
comparative fault from tort law, the recommendations adopt an
approach eliminating many of the costs and absurdities inherent in
the present rules while preserving the policy benefits sought by the
* Assistant Counsel, William H. Rorer, Inc., Fort Washington, Pennsylvania. J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1975); B.A., Colgate University (1972). I would like to thank Ralph W.
Brenner for his encouragement and guidance with this article.
1. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See notes
24-58 and accompanying text infra.
2. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947). See notes 4-23 and
accompanying text infra.
3. This by itself is somewhat remarkable in light of the general rule that when a court
finds that the parties come to court with unclean hands, it simply leaves them where it found
them. See note 63 infra.
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law. Furthermore, it is suggested that the courts can implement the
proposals without congressional action.
II.

ANTITRUST CLAIMS AS DEFENSES FOR PAYMENT OF GOODS

Before their own antitrust conduct was granted its current privileged status, plaintiffs often attempted to use defendants' antitrust
violations as a total shield. Relying on the general principle that
courts will not enforce an illegal contract,' plaintiffs argued that if
a contract violated the antitrust law courts should not enforce it in
any respect, thereby prohibiting the defendant's recovery for the
price of goods already sold to the plaintiff.
After some hesitation the Supreme Court, quite properly, rejected
this argument. The Court noted that plaintiffs' position would have
imposed a sanction not contemplated by Congress, bearing no relation to the antitrust offense.' The plaintiff would have been able to
recover both treble damages and the price of as much merchandise
as he could acquire before the defendant refused to sell to him.
Implicit in the Court's rejection was the recognition of the absurdity of sanctioning a plaintiff's taking goods without paying for
them. More recently, the Court elaborated upon its position. In
Kelly v. Kosuga,I a diversity action, Kosuga sued for the purchase
price of 50 carloads of onions. Kelly interposed the defense that the
sale was made pursuant to, and as an indivisible part of, an agreement which violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district
court granted a motion to strike the defense and entered summary
judgment for the unpaid purchase price and storage charges. The
court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court prefaced its analysis
by noting that the contract defense of illegality based on the Sherman Act had never been well-received by the Justices. 7 In affirming
the judgment below and disallowing the antitrust defense, the Court
distinguished a leading case in which the defense was allowed. In
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 8 the seller
was an agent for companies doing business as a pool and selling at
excessive and unreasonable prices fixed through the agreement. The
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §§ 115, 221 (1964).
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
358 U.S. 516 (1959).
Id. at 518.
212 U.S. 227 (1909).

1977-78

The Antitrust Plaintiff

Court there refused to give judgment for the excessive purchase
price since, otherwise, the courts would be assisting in the violation
of the law. Following its analysis of Continental Wallpaper, the
Kelly Court announced the applicable rule.
Past the point where the judgment of the Court would itself be
enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the Act, the
Courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy, as Mr.
Justice Holmes put it, "of preventing people from getting other
people's property for nothing when they purport to be buying
it." Supplying a sanction for the violation of the Act, not in
terms provided and capricious in its operation, is avoided by
treating the defense as so confined.
Accordingly, while the nondelivery agreement between the
parties could not be enforced by a court, if its unlawful character under the Sherman Act be assumed, it can hardly be said
to enforce a violation of the Act to give legal effect to a completed sale of onions at a fair price. . . . [I1n any event,
where, as here, a lawful sale for a fair consideration constitutes
an intelligible economic transaction in itself, we do not think
it inappropriate or violative of the intent of the parties to give
it effect even though it furnished the occasion for a restrictive
agreement of the sort here in question.'
Under this general rule, if a sales contract does not involve illegal
price fixing, and the consideration appears to be fair, an antitrust
violation arising out of the relationship between the parties is not a
defense to an action on the contract.
Subsequent decisions from lower federal courts demonstrate how
narrowly the exception to this rule is construed. For example, in
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.," ° Royster, the seller,
brought an action for breach of contract to purchase. Columbia, the
buyer, asserted antitrust defenses and counterclaims based upon
Royster's reciprocal trade practices, that is, the use of buying power
to secure an advantage in the sale of one's products, which Columbia alleged violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. On appeal from
a judgment in favor of the seller, the court of appeals remanded on
9. 358 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted). See generally Sobel, Antitrust Defenses to
Contract Actions: A Question of Policy Priorities,16 ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (1971).
10. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
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the contract interpretation issue. The court, however, affirmed the
district court ruling on the antitrust issues.
Even if reciprocal dealing that violated section 1 was proven,
Kelly precluded the defendant-buyer from interposing such a violation as an affirmative defense to an action on the contract. The
court stated:
Here, as in Kelly, the sale was "an intelligible economic
transaction in itself," the price was fair, and the terms were
voluntarily accepted. By the time Royster brought this action,
the parties had terminated their reciprocal dealing, and the
award of damages to Royster cannot exclude competitors. We
conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on Columbia's affirmative defense of
noncoercive reciprocity."
Other courts have followed this approach;'" simply alleging that an
11. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
12. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Malco Petroleum, Inc., 471 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1972), the
court of appeals held that a distributor could not defend against a suit based on a promissory
note by asserting that enforcement of the note would sanction an illegal tying agreement
(credit was the tying product and the oil company's products the tied products). The court
found that the distributor had insisted on the loan, and had the unrestricted use of the
$200,000 at stake for more than seven years without repaying any of it. Stating that the
defendant would not be allowed to use antitrust law to avoid paying its just debts, the court
noted that if there was an illegal tying agreement which injured the distributor, there is an
adequate remedy under the antitrust laws. Id. at 1261. See also Arkla Air Conditioning Co.
v. Famous Supply Co., 551 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1977) (the district courts in the Sixth Circuit
are in accord). Where the plaintiff sued for the price of raw materials against the guarantor
of payment for the buyer, and established the debt, the district court in Exxon Corp. v. Time
Indus. Inc., [1974-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 74,926 (E.D. Mich. 1974), held that the defendant could not raise the plaintiff's alleged Robinson-Patman violations as a defense to the
contract action. More recently, in a suit where plaintiff claimed that defendant's pricing
practices violated the Sherman Act, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant who counterclaimed for sums allegedly due for food and supplies. Crivello v. Four
Brothers, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 218 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
In a slightly different context, the Fifth Circuit also applied the general rule in Response
of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050
(1974). In Carolina, a franchisor was seeking to recover unpaid royalties and rentals, and to
gain possession of leased equipment. The court held that the franchisor was improperly
enjoined from prosecuting the suit in state court. Id. at 321. The defendant's claim that the
franchise agreements contained illegal territorial restrictions was held to be no defense to the
suit. The contract provision sued upon in state court did not embody or further the alleged
anticompetitive practices. Further, the court believed that both comity and federalism mitigated against federal injunctions against state courts. Id. at 319. See also R & J Sales, Inc.
v. Siesta Sleep Shop, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1974).
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antitrust violation affected price is not enough to invoke an excep13
tion and thus not enough to defeat a claim on the contract.
Even those cases finding the exception to be applicable recognize
its narrow scope. The Seventh Circuit allowed an antitrust counterclaim to block what arguably was a contract suit although not involving payment for purchased goods. In Milsen Co. v. Southland
Corp., 4 convenience grocery store franchisees brought an antitrust
action against the franchisor alleging restraint of trade through tieins and price fixing. The franchisor counterclaimed for nonpayment
of franchise fees and rents, threatening to terminate the franchises.
In the Tenth Circuit, the District Court for the District of Colorado held simply that a party
cannot enjoin collection of debts on the theory that those debts arose out of acts constituting
violations of the antitrust laws. Q-T Markets, Inc v. Fleming Companies, 394 F. Supp. 1102
(D. Colo. 1975).
The Second Circuit has considered this problem in an entire line of cases. Recently, in
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Prods., Inc., 526 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975), the court analyzed the
policies underlying the rule of Kelly. While recognizing that the standard of whether any
allegedly illegal arrangement was "inherently illegal" or whether the agreement constituted
"an intelligible economic transaction" may be too imprecise to be useful, the court felt that
the overriding consideration in such cases is the concern that successful interposition of
antitrust defenses is likely to enrich parties who reap the benefits of the contract and then
seek to avoid the corresponding burdens. Id. at 599. In addition, toleration of antitrust
defenses to contract actions would draw all parties claiming under a disputed contract into
litigation so protracted and expensive that they might be coerced into unsatisfactory settlements or forego prosecution of their claims. Id. While this factor of coercion may not be
present in all cases, the idea that courts should be very wary of allowing someone to accept
the benefits of a contract while repudiating its burdens under an antitrust claim, is persuasive.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York has held that service stations
being sued by their supplier for amounts owed for gasoline purchases under a sales contract
cannot assert (either as a counterclaim or as a defense) the supplier's alleged antitrust violations. BP Oil Corp. v. Park Stations, Inc., [1976-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,853 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). Finally, in O.L.T. Premium Distribs., Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America,
(1972-11 TRADE CASES (CCH)
74,110 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court held that a plaintiff's
antitrust claim could not act as a defense to a counterclaim for the price of goods sold and
delivered. The court stated that this was not a case where the price was itself infected with
illegality, such that enforcing the plaintiff's obligation would make the court a party to the
carrying out of the restraints prescribed by the antitrust laws.
These cases all dealt with situations where the antitrust claim was asserted as a defense.
Where it is simply asserted as a permissive counterclaim, different factors must be considered. See Gutor Int'l AG v. Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1974).
13. This was expressly held by the Supreme Court in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947), where the Court refused to prevent the seller from recovering
for goods sold and delivered when the buyer raised the objection that the price of the goods
themselves violated the Robinson-Patman Act. Accord, El Salto, S.A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d
477 (9th Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Seanor Coal, 382 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1967); Exxon Corp. v.
Time Indus., Inc., [1974-11 TRADE CASES (CCH) 74,926 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
14. 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971).
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The court temporarily enjoined the franchisor from terminating the
franchises pending the antitrust litigation. The court found that the
plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of antitrust violations
and recognized that the franchisor risked little in allowing the continued operation of the store, whereas plaintiffs would lose their
stores thus jeopardizing the financing of the antitrust suit if the
injunction were not granted.
The Milsen court held that Kelly was not controlling since the
franchisees did not owe fees for goods resold. It believed that if the
franchisor was allowed to collect franchise fees or terminate the
franchises, the court would be, in effect, approving the alleged antitrust violations. Apparently the franchisor charged the franchisees
a percentage of gross sales for the very services that permitted it to
enforce its alleged policies of price fixing and tying. Thus, it appears
that the franchisor sought direct enforcement of the allegedly illegal
franchise agreement, rather than enforcement of an agreement for
the sale of goods. 5
In Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Shopping Cart, Inc.,"5 another
example where the exception was applied, the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment against the defendant for failure to pay for trading stamps was denied on three separate bases. First, the court
found there was a dispute as to the amount of the debt. Second,
given a prior FTC order, a question arose as to whether the contract
was legally enforceable. Finally, the defendant asserted an antitrust
defense, alleging that the plaintiff had individually, and in conspiracy with other stamp merchants, endeavored to fix and regulate the
rate of stamp dispensation throughout the industry. The court
agreed with the defendant that plaintiff's policy should be consid15. This should be distinguished from the question of payment of rent, which appears to
be uniformly required, regardless of the antitrust offense alleged. See, e.g., Abercrombie v.
Lum's, Inc., 531 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1976); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d
1068 (8th Cir. 1971). In Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., [1973-1] TRADE CASES (CCH)
74,320
(D.N.J. 1972), the court granted summary judgment for the defendant on its counterclaim
that alleged plaintiff wrongfully failed to vacate leased property. The alleged antritrust violations of the defendant were not held to be a valid defense. An antitrust suit, or decision, could
give an appropriate remedy, but such a remedy is not the continued possession of leased
property. This theory was recently expanded to its ultimate limits by the Ninth Circuit in
Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 555 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court there held that even if Memorex entered the market by stealing IBM trade secrets,
Memorex was allowed to sue IBM for antitrust violations. It also noted that IBM's alleged
antitrust misconduct would not be a defense to a suit for such theft of trade secrets.
16. [1975-2] TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 60,506 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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ered price fixing, and held as an alternate ground for denying summary judgment that enforcing the contract over the antitrust defense would be upholding the very conduct alleged to be illegal.
Thus, insofar as this decision rests on the antitrust issue, it is a
classic example of the price fixing exception to the Kelly rule. 7
The relation of Kelly to the question of plaintiff's conduct in an
antitrust violation surfaced in two recent cases. In Carpa, Inc. v.
Ward Foods, Inc.,"5 a restaurant franchisee sued his franchisor for
illegal tying arrangements. The lower court upheld plaintiffs claim
cancelling a lease that bound him to pay an excessive rental due to
tied charges. Had the agreement not been terminated, the plaintiff
would have suffered an additional $11,115 in excess rental charges.
On appeal, however, the plaintiff sought treble damages claiming
that under the rule of Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 9
treble damages, rather than contract termination, was the only
proper remedy. This attempt to use the general rule as a sword
deservedly failed. The court would not allow itself to be used to
pyramid the plaintiff's recovery.2 Yet, as discussed below,2 had
the plaintiff simply waited until it had paid the charges, it could
have recovered them, trebled.
In Dickstein v. duPont,22 the plaintiff sued to collect a commission, while attempting to avoid an arbitration clause in his employment contract by arguing that enforcement would violate the Sherman Act. The court, in ruling that it need not consider the antitrust
claim under Kelly, held that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
claim a commission under one part of the contract and, at the same
time, repudiate an inconvenient part of the same contract as illegal.
Yet, if a plaintiff is allowed to collect antitrust damages in spite
of his participation in the allegedly illegal scheme, he is allowed to
17. See Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909);
Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 382 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1967). See generally AMF Inc. v. Polk,
(1973-11 TRADE CASES (CCH) 74, 445 (W.D. Ark. 1973) (the district court, without specifying why or how, allowed an antitrust counterclaim as a defense on a suit to collect a debt).
The Polk case would be more ominous, did it not appear from the facts that the plaintiff was
suing to collect the "minimal rentals" owed to it pursuant to the very lease agreements
alleged to violate the antitrust laws. Arguably, enforcement of the contract action would have
required the court to enforce the very agreement which was being called into question.
18. 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976).
19. 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
20. 536 F.2d at 49.
21. See notes 58-63 and accompanying text infra.
22. 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971).
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do what the Dickstein court sought to avoid. He is permitted to
accept the benefits of an arrangement until he decides that it no
longer suits him. At that point, he can sue and recover three times
the difference between what he chose to accept, and what the court
finds he should have been offered.

III.

PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS AS A DEFENSE TO AN ANTITRUST SUIT

Although it may strike a non-antitrust lawyer as odd, the Supreme Court has, in construing the antitrust laws, specifically authorized one criminal co-conspirator to sue and recover treble damages from another. 23 Furthermore, a plaintiff does not have to show
that he was coerced or pressured into joining the conspiracy to recover. This is not only curious, but when viewed in light of the
policies it is designed to further, it becomes incredible.
Before 1968 the rule was simple: a voluntary party to an agreement that formed the basis of an antitrust suit could not recover
damages from the suit. 2 The key word is "voluntary"; plaintiff's
participation did not bar his recovery when he was coerced into
participation. 25 The cases are clear, however, that coercion had a
limited scope. The mere lure of profits, without more, was not
deemed to "coerce" anyone.
The concept that voluntary participation in the illegality bars
recovery, expressed by the slightly terrifying Latin phrase, in pari
23. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Compare
the famous "Highwayman's Case," Everet v. Williams, Ex. 1725, reported in 9 L.Q. REv. 197
(1893), and cited in W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 305 n.40 (4th ed.

1971). The case involved an attempt by one highway robber to sue his cohort for a share of
the loot. The suit was dismissed; the plaintiff's solicitors were fined 50 pounds each for
contempt, and both the plaintiff and defendant later were hanged. See Lachman v. SperrySun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972).
While this article does not necessarily advocate hanging treble-damage plaintiffs, it does
suggest that the legal system should not let itself be used by one criminal against another.
Violations of the antitrust laws when government-prosecuted are criminal violations. See,
e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (violation
of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970)).
24. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated G.E.L. & P. Co., 209 F.2d
131, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954); see generally Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1966) (cataloging cases on this point).
25. See, e.g., Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 274 F.2d 217,
223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960); Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439,
444 (8th Cir. 1964). Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (supplier may not use
coercion on its retail outlets to achieve maintenance of resale price).

1977-78

The Antitrust Plaintiff

delicto melior est conditio possidentis or in pari delicto melior est
conditio defendentis, has a long legal ancestry. When a contract is
illegal, and the parties are in pari delicto,2 8 courts traditionally will
not allow a suit for specific performance, for recovery of property or
purchase price, or for damages for breach of warranty."7 If the parties are not equally blameworthy, a court can aid the more innocent
one, possibly granting him full relief.2" As noted above, the victim
of coercion is not in pari delicto.29
The operation of the doctrine was demonstrated in Ryan v. Motor
Circuit Co.,30 a non-antitrust case but nonetheless relevant. The
plaintiff, Mr. Ryan, sought cancellation of notes he had given to
Motor Credit Co., refund of money paid on them, and recovery of a
penalty from the defendant on the theory that loans secured by the
notes violated a state statute. Ryan participated in obtaining loans
under circumstances where he, as well as the defendant, knew that
the loans might be illegal.
Although the court cancelled the outstanding contracts because
of prior illegality, it rejected Ryan's theory. In language which could
easily be used in the antitrust context, the court said:
Ryan is not only seeking to be relieved of the consequences of
a fraud in which he was long an active participant, but he is
also seeking to obtain the benefits of the very statute which is
the subject of his fraud. A moment's appraisal of just what is
sought by Ryan in this suit is sufficient to shock the conscience
of the court and close its door against him. . . . He is entitled
to relief on his outstanding contracts to the extent that it is
afforded to him by a refusal to entertain the defendants' counterclaim. He is not entitled, in this court, to any reward for his
perfidy. Nor are the defendants rewarded by denying reward to
the complainant. They lose . . . as a result of their fraud,
which is a punishment to fit their crime; and under the statute
they are liable to indictment for misdemeanor.'
26. Freely translated, it means "equally to blame."
27. 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 940 (4th ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as
POMEROY]. See also McGhee's Adm'r v. Elcomb Coal Co., 288 Ky. 540, 156 S.W.2d 868 (1941).
28. POMEROY, supra note 27, § 942.
29. Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 23 A.2d 607, 617 (N.J. Eq. 1941) (full discussion of the
doctrine of in pari delicto and it application).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 624.
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The reasonableness of this approach commends its application to
antitrust cases. If the plaintiff's participation was truly coerced, it
is fair to let him sue and recover. Absent coercion, the plaintiff
should not be permitted to profit from his wrong.
In 1968 the rules were radically changed, and antitrust plaintiffs
received a peculiar kind of sanctity, justified by neither law nor
policy. Modern case law flows from the Supreme Court's decision
in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp.3 The
plaintiffs, "Midas Muffler Shop" dealers, charged that Midas conspired with the other named defendants-its parent corporation,
two other subsidiaries, and six individual defendants who were officers or agents of the corporations-to restrain and lessen substantially competition. The district court entered summary judgment
for defendants on all of the claims. The court of appeals reversed
on the Robinson-Patman claim of discrimination in pricing, but
affirmed the lower court ruling that the doctrine of in pari delicto
barred the remaining claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the common law doctrine of in pari delicto was not a defense
to treble-damage actions:
In light of these considerations, we cannot accept the Court
of Appeals' idea that courts have power to undermine the antitrust acts by denying recovery to injured parties merely because they have participated to the extent of utilizing illegal
arrangements formulated and carried out by others. Although
petitioners may be subject to some criticism for having taken
any part in respondents' allegedly illegal scheme and for eagerly seeking more franchises and more profits, their participation was not voluntary in any meaningful sense. . . . The possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a plaintiff's
point of view can of course be taken into consideration in computing damages, but once it is shown that the plaintiff did not
aggressively support and further the monopolistic scheme as a
necessary part and parcel of it, his understandable attempt to
make the best of a bad situation should not be a ground for
completely denying him the right to recover which the antitrust
acts give him. . . . We need not decide. . . whether. . . truly
complete involvement [for example, participation in the program's formulation] could ever be a basis, wholly apart from
32.

392 U.S. 134 (1968).

The Antitrust Plaintiff
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the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiffs cause of
action. .... 1
.

Justices White, Fortas, Marshall, Harlan, and Stewart wrote separate concurring opinions. All five Justices stressed they would deny
recovery in cases where the plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for the injury. Justice Fortas suggested as
an example a plaintiff who"originated and insisted upon the inclusion of a territorial exclusivity clause which was not in the franchise
as drafted by the franchisor. He could not recover damages based
upon this, if, essentially, it is his own act. '3 Justice Marshall proposed a somewhat broader theory:
However, if Midas could show, which it has quite clearly not
done at this stage of the litigation, that petitioners actually
participated in the formulation of the entire agreement, trading off anticompetitive restraints on their own freedom of action (such as the tying and exclusive dealing provisions) for
anticompetitive restraints intended for their benefit (such as
resale price maintenance or exclusive territories), petitioners
should be barred from seeking damages as to the agreement as
a whole."5
The key problem with the Perma Life decision and its several
separate opinions is the absence of a rational framework for handling such cases. The Court abolished in pari delicto as a defense,
but failed to establish or even to suggest any reasoned analytical
framework for dealing with plaintiff conduct. Lower courts have
read the decision as making plaintiff's conduct immaterial, except
where it rises to the level of originating the restraint in question-the "exception" which the facts did not present in Perma
Life. Some courts simply hold that a plaintiff's conduct, no matter
how egregious, is not available as a defense in an antitrust action. 3
33. Id. at 139-40.
34. Id. at 148 (emphasis in original) (Fortas, J., concurring in result).
35. Id. at 150 (Marshall, J., concurring in result).
36. Fairfield County Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp.
376 (D. Conn. 1974); Schokbeton Prods. Corp. v. Exposaic Indus., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1366
(N.D. Ga. 1969). See generally Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1369-70
(10th Cir. 1972).
The FairfieldCounty case may not be good law any longer, because the Second Circuit has
since recognized that the plaintiff's conduct may, in some instances, bar his recovery. See
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1975).
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The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have recognized that under certain circumstances the conduct
of the plaintiff may bar his recovery. But some circuits rarely apply
this principle or, as in the case of the Second Circuit, have not yet
applied it at the court of appeals level."7
In American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,'3 the Third
Circuit limited the defense to cases where the plaintiff actively participated either in forming, encouraging, continuing, or supporting
the entire restrictive program. But the court held that the facts of
the case did not warrant such a conclusion. The Fifth Circuit recognized in Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,39 that Perma Life
is not authority for the proposition that a plaintiff could recover all
costs incurred in price fixing promotions regardless of whether he
was compelled to participate or participated voluntarily. 0 More recently, in Greene v. General Foods Corp.,4' the court questioned
whether any defense based upon plaintiff's actions still existed. The
court, however, decided that it need not answer this where a great
disparity between the parties existed in terms of their responsibility
for establishing the system and receiving benefits from it.4"
The Sixth Circuit adheres to the majority rule, allowing application of the defense if the plaintiff was equally responsible with the
defendant in forming the scheme.4 3

37. In Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975), the court affirmed
the existence of the defense, and cited with approval the earlier case of Skouras Theaters
Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Skouras devoted considerable attention to the question, collecting the cases decided to date, and determined:
To come within the kind of factual situation which gave rise to the question which
the court in Perma Life found it unnecessary to decide and which was dealt with in
some detail in the four concurring opinions, defendants must demonstrate that plaintiffs' participation in the conspiracy reached the same degree of involvement and
culpability as that of defendants and that plaintiffs, deliberately and of their own
volition, actively supported the illegal scheme for their own self-interest.
Id. at 360. Since this essentially is a question of fact, the court denied a motion for summary
judgment on behalf of the defendants.
38. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). See also In re REA Express, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1239,
1254 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (limiting Perma Life by not expanding it to cover equitable defenses
other than in pari delicto in cases involving § I of the Sherman Act).
39. 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 695.
41. 517 F.2d 635, 647 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. Although the court clearly felt that the defendant both established the system and
reaped most of its benefits, these two points will not always go in tandem. The court left open
the question of applying the defense where the defendant formulates the scheme, but the
plaintiff took most of the benefit from it.
43. South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 784 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).

1977-78

The Antitrust Plaintiff

In the Seventh Circuit, plaintiff's immunity has been expanded
from that granted by the standard formulation. In PremierElectrical Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.," the court stated: "Thus,
we believe that Perma Life holds only that plaintiffs who do not bear
equal responsibility for creating and establishing an illegal scheme,
or who are required by economic pressures to accept such an agreement, should not be barred from recovery simply because they are
participants."4 5 It is unclear what is meant by "economic pressures." Potentially, the term is broad enough to provide plaintiff
with a total shield.
Whereas most courts have merely recognized the defense, the
Ninth Circuit has actually held that a plaintiff's recovery was
barred by his actions. The rule adopted was that only an equal
partner in the alleged conspiracy would be barred. In Dreibus v.
Wilson,4" the plaintiff was a co-founder and 50% shareholder of the
allegedly corporate wrongdoer. The court of appeals adopted the
district court's reasoning:
[Elven if the establishment of this dealership could constitute
monopolization, these plaintiffs cannot recover for it. By their
own allegations plaintiffs are the originating, active persons
responsible for its establishment. Although the Supreme Court
abolished in pari delicto as a defense in antitrust cases, the
court [sic] indicated that a high degree of involvement in the
illegal act could constitute a defense. 7
The court refined what degree of involvement was required to invoke
the defense in Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc." Reversing a grant of
summary judgment for the defendant, the court analyzed the
emerging law and laid down a pragmatic "but for" or "substantial
factor" standard of causation as the level of proof to be met by the
defendant before plaintiff's action could be barred."9
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1138.
529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 174.
546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 279-80. The court stated:
Accordingly, we hold that summary judgment for the defendant was improperly
granted in this case. A plaintiff is barred from recovery only when the illegal conspiracy
would not have been formed but for the plaintiffs participation. To satisfy this test,
the jury must necessarily find that the degree of participation of the plaintiff must be
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A new wrinkle was added to Perma Life by the Fourth Circuit in
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.,50 an action for breach of
contract for the purchase of supplies. In Royster Co., the defendant
asserted an antitrust defense and counterclaim based upon plaintiff's alleged reciprocal trade practices. The lower court entered
judgment for the plaintiff. Although reversing the case on various
contract matters, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment as to
the antitrust issues. The court held that the lower court committed
no error by declining to instruct the jury that the defendant could
recover on its counterclaim if it proved a noncoercive agreement for
reciprocal dealing. The court below had held that there was no
coercive reciprocity; therefore, the defendant was limited, in presenting its noncoercive theory of recovery, to evidence disclosing
the voluntary, joint participation and equal fault of the parties.'
Columbia's counterclaim is the type of case the Court expressly excluded from the scope of its opinion. Separate opinions in Perma Life representing the views of five of the members of the Court, however, provide guidance for the resolution
of this issue. These opinions teach that when parties of substantially equal economic strength mutually participate in the
formulation and execution of the scheme and bear equal responsibility for the consequent restraint of trade, each is barred
from seeking treble damages from the other.
We think it plain, therefore, that a party, who voluntarily
formulates and equally participates in a non-coercive agreement for reciprocal dealing until a declining market makes its
purchases unprofitable, cannot maintain an action under § 1
of the Sherman Act against its trading partner."2
equal to that of any defendant and a substantial factor in the formation of the conspiracy. The instigator of an illegal scheme clearly is barred under this test. Whether
founding members of a conspiracy are barred is a question of fact for the jury based
on the above test.
The "but for" standard places a high burden of proof upon any defendant seeking
to bar the plaintiff's suit on the basis of joint participation. But the plaintiff is suing
not only in its own behalf, but as a "private attorney general" representing the public
interest. Congress established the private remedy to enlist the public as enforcers of
the antitrust laws. The courts should encourage this function.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 15-16.

1977-78

The Antitrust Plaintiff

The holding of the case is somewhat at variance with its explanation
on one crucial ground. In none of the separate opinions in Perma
Life was it stated that the defense of a plaintiff's actions is available
only where the plaintiff and defendant are of "substantially equal
economic strength." If this is indeed a factor, it is one added by the
Fourth Circuit in its formulation of the rule. Insofar as the facts may
be discerned from the Supreme Court's opinion in Perma Life, there
is no indication that the two parties in the case were of substantially
equal economic strength. All that appears to have been resolved by
the district court in Columbia Nitrogen was that the reciprocity was
not the result of coercion by the defendant.
Perma Life held that the defense could not apply if the plaintiff
was forced to accept the restrictive agreement or, arguably, if the
plaintiff had not sought the restrictive agreement. But, if the plaintiff sought the restriction, there is no reason to hold the defense does
not apply simply because the plaintiff and defendant are not of
comparable economic strength. In addition, the final formulation of
the rule in Columbia Nitrogen, quoted above, does not include consideration of the economic strength of the parties. It does refer to
the questions of whether the plaintiff voluntarily helped formulate
the plan, whether he participated in it equally with the defendant,
and whether the agreement between plaintiff and defendant was
noncoercive (the last point appears redundant, given the first).
It is too soon to predict how the criterion apparently added by the
Fourth Circuit will be interpreted. In a subsequent decision,
Midway Enterprises,Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp.,53 a district
court in the Fourth Circuit did not apply the criterion of
"substantially equal economic strength," but rather applied a new
test of "equal bargaining power."54 The similarity is only on the
surface: a small company may have enormous bargaining power visa-vis an antitrust violator due to factors totally unrelated to its
economic strength as a company (a good location, special customer
lists, etc.). Thus, at this juncture, it is unclear in the Fourth Circuit
what, if anything, must be proven beyond the plaintiff's willing and
equal participation in the alleged restraint before the plaintiff's own
actions can be used as a defense to his antitrust claim.
Aside from the Fourth Circuit's aberrational foray into the ques53.
54.

375 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1974).
Id. at 1347.
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tion of the economic strength of the parties,55 the lower courts seem
to require that the plaintiff either instigate the illegal scheme or at
least substantially participate in its organization before the defense
will apply. As the following hypothetical cases illustrate, such a
requirement serves to encourage toleration of antitrust violations.
First, if the plaintiff suggests and successfully promotes the
scheme, all agree that he cannot later sue for damages incurred.
Second, if plaintiff suggests the scheme, and the defendant adopts
it enthusiastically, plaintiff is still the instigator, and, in the writer's
view, should be barred. At this point there is a parting of the actual
and "fair" results. The third case is where the defendant suggests
the scheme and the plaintiff eagerly, or at least willingly, adopts it.
In the reported cases, plaintiff can sue and recover, since he did not
originate the scheme. The last case is Perma Life-the defendant
proposes the scheme and compels allegiance to it. Here again, plaintiff can sue and recover. The question which has never been answered, though, is why.
Fairness may require that a plaintiff who joined the defendant's
antitrust scheme be protected, at least to the extent of contribution
by the defendant, from actions by third parties." But it does not
follow that this protective measure should be viable as a sword.
Courts tend to overlook that a plaintiff is rarely held at gun point
and forced to join the defendant's business deal.57 Normally, he joins
voluntarily, to make money. Why should he be permitted to make
the deal with his eyes open, milk it for as long as he chooses, and
then collect treble damages later?
The answer, if one exists, is to be found in the concept of plaintiff
as private attorney general.'With all due delicacy, however, this is
insufficient to justify the present system. One would hope that an
55. Actual coercion by the defendant may be relevant to the discussion. See note 27 and
accompanying text supra. But abstract economic size tells us nothing about the plaintiff's
participation in the scheme. One district court flatly rejected the Fourth Circuit's economic
size test. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex.
1976).
56. In this situation, the question of the relative economic size of the parties may be
relevant. If IT&T joins a scheme by a local corporation, it may be fair to assume that IT&T
had its lawyers check the legality of the enterprise, and hence indemnity would be inappropriate.
57. At least research has not disclosed such a case. In fairness, it should be pointed out
that the absurdity of the Court's result in Perma Life on this point was foreshadowed by at
least one commentator. See Comment, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private
Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1965).
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attorney general, public or private, would have as his clearly established purpose, the deterrence and termination of antitrust violations. Yet no such requirement burdens the private plaintiff; he is
allowed to join the scheme fully intending to remain and to "get
religion" only when it benefits him. Further, why should our private
attorney general get "paid" treble damages? If it is to encourage
him to sue, it is indeed an odd sort of encouragement.
If the policy behind the private attorney general construct, behind
allowing co-conspirators to sue their cohorts, is to encourage elimination of antitrust violations-and I believe that it is-the current
law flatly contradicts that policy. As it now stands, the law encourages a plaintiff to keep the scheme in operation for the four year
period of the statute of limitations before suing;55 each year, his
damages grow. Allowing recovery of only single damages might
eliminate this effect, but the current treble damage provision makes
waiting attractive."9 We encourage the continuation of antitrust violations by offering a plaintiff a substantial reward for not becoming
a private attorney general for four years.
One may legitimately wonder whether the principle that a plain58. Four years is the statute of limitations period for antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(1970).
59. Assume a loss of $10,000 per year. If plaintiff sues after one year he can obtain
damages of $30,000, $20,000 of which is profit. If he waits 2 years, his profit jumps to $40,000.
And after 4 years, the profit hits $80,000. In all cases the statute provides for attorney fees as
well.
The above analysis is somewhat over-simplified in that it does not take into account
possible settlement of the suit before trial. In the writer's experience in private practice,
settlements often result in a recovery of less than total actual damages (untrebled). Since
most cases do settle, it might be argued that the plaintiff would be encouraged to sue quickly;
he may not recover his entire loss much less receive a windfall recovery. This argument rests
on the fallacy that all plaintiffs' cases are of equal strength. What appears to happen is that
the plaintiff with a strong case has an incentive to delay suit. Since his chances of winning
at trial are greater, a settlement will be for a higher amount.
Another factor which has been deliberately excluded from the example is the degree of the
defendant's resistance to the suit. Obviously a defendant, no longer in the business at issue,
or no longer in the jurisdiction, may be more anxious to compromise a plausible suit against
it than might be an ongoing company. This factor is hardly unique to treble damage suits,
and it has no apparent relationship to allowing a co-conspirator to sue for damages.
One factor which may be relevant is that if plaintiff decides to sue, his case becomes more
complex and expensive. This is no problem if he wins, since he recovers both costs and
attorney fees under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). But to the extent there is doubt as to the ultimate
result, the increase in litigation expense may persuade him to sue earlier.
The above analysis only serves to reinforce the basic point: The plaintiff with the strong
case has the incentive to wait. But it is in just such a case-where the violation is, by
hypothesis, clear-that the public interest lies in halting it immediately.
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tiff is required to mitigate his damages has any application here.
Although it should, the short answer is that the principle has not
been applied. In the antitrust context, courts appear to require mitigation by a plaintiff only after the antitrust injury is in some way
complete. While this may make sense in a refusal to deal case, it
accomplishes nothing where the business relationship itself exists
and is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. For example, in
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.,60 plaintiff claimed the defendant withdrew his price supports as a result of the plaintiffs setting his own
retail prices, and that this withdrawal forced the plaintiff out of
business. Only the damages for future profits that he might have
made had he stayed in business were mitigated, and those by what
he did -earn in the years in question.'
Clearly, to allow a plaintiff to quit an arrangement and deliberately not seek other income would be outrageous.62 Yet the courts
fail to perceive that to allow a plaintiff to delay his suit, and thereby
pyramid his damages, is to do just that. In sum, not only does the
present law allow a party who would normally be barred63 to sue, but
it encourages continuation of antitrust violations for up to four
years.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE PROPOSAL

Although a court may honestly believe that the two rules discussed above have the net effect of simply allowing each side to
recover what it is due, this plainly is inaccurate. An antitrust violator can recover for goods sold and delivered, thus forcing an antitrust plaintiff to meet its prior contractual obligations. On the other
hand, an antitrust plaintiff is clearly in a special position; he can
enforce the bargain, and reap the benefit of a new contract, trebled. 4 The time is overdue to reexamine this entire area.
60. 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
61. Id. at 46. But cf. Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.
1977) (requiring mitigation in another refusal to deal situation).
62. See Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
63. See, e.g., Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1947); Wheeling Dollar Say.
& Trust Co. v. Hoffman, 127 W. Va. 777, 35 S.E.2d 84, (1945). See also notes 24 and 25 supra.
Cf. Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 555 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977)
(thief of trade secrets permitted to sue its victim).
64. The writer hopes that he is not alone in seeing something bizarre about court behavior
here. In a typical case, the plaintiff and defendant make a contract, and the defendant fully
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The basic question is why a direct and willing participant in an
5
illegal activity should be allowed damages from that activity. As
previously noted, the plaintiff is not usually coerced into joining
with the defendant." The traditional answer-that the plaintiff is
acting as a private attorney general-is really no answer at all.
Recovery in private suits may bear no relationship to the amount
gained by the defendant from the illegal activity. Moreover, the
action in no way considers the amount gained by the plaintiff from
his participation in the illegality. Finally, it is a peculiar rule that
rewards an attorney general, public or private, for allowing the continuation of the illegal acts for up to four years.
The present use of the private attorney general concept only confuses without benefit to law or society. The concept, however, properly limited, can be of some value.
The first point, upon which most would agree, is that no party
should be bound to an illegal arrangement. Hence, a plaintiff must
be allowed to terminate a relationship regardless of his participation
in its creation. 7 The public policy favoring the prompt termination
of such illegal situations necessitates at least this much. The question is whether public policy should require something more.
Although the above discussion" suggested it is conceptually
performs. The court, at the behest of the plaintiff, then finds the contract illegal. Instead of
stopping there, the court goes on to determine what the plaintiff would have received had
the contract been legal, and forces the defendant in effect to enter into that contract retroactively. Then, the defendant is not only forced to pay the difference between the actual
contract and the court-created one, but is forced to do so three times over (treble damages).
Were a proposal to have courts rewrite and enforce contracts in this manner introduced
into Congress, it can hardly be doubted that the conceptual absurdity of such judicial contract making would be recognized. Yet, where the same absurd result is reached by accretion
of judicial decisions, the slow encroachment apparently has lulled us into ignoring what
actually has taken place.
65. Normally we do not allow one to profit from his own wrong. See, e.g., United States
v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D. Mich. 1950). Why should we do so here?
66. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. Should such a case of actual coercion arise,
courts could handle it by allowing termination of the contract, with perhaps punitive damages. If the present rule takes such an actual coercion situation as its paradigm, and the cases
do not support such a view, then it is grotesquely overbroad.
67. This could be done either by allowing plaintiff to bring the suit, or by allowing the
illegality to be raised as a defense to any action to compel future performance. This was the
traditional rule. See, e.g., Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 23 A.2d 607 (N.J. Eq. 1941). In allowing
such termination, I do not mean to allow a plaintiff to escape paying for goods sold and
delivered previously. Such payment should always be required, subject to plaintiff's right to
recoup some of it in damages as set forth below.
68. See notes 23, 24, 63 & 65 and accompanying text supra.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 307

anomalous to let a co-conspirator sue for damages, my proposal
recognizes that something of this sort probably is inevitable. Given
the policy of stopping antitrust violations, and the impossibility of
the government completely handling the task, some form of private
enforcement must be allowed. Our objective is to encourage enforcement without rewarding delay or entrapment. To disqualify a party
who was involved with the illegal scheme is conceputally proper, but
may be unduly harsh. In fact, it would place antitrust law where tort
law paused years ago-any contributory act by the plaintiff totally
bars recovery. 9
The analogy is more than descriptive. What is proposed here is
that antitrust law adopt a form of comparative fault, similar to
comparative negligence. Implementing such a standard would allow
suit by a less than innocent plaintiff, while limiting recovery in
proportion to the plaintiffs illicit conduct.70 Under this proposal,
suit would be totally barred only where the plaintiff's actions were
responsible for 50% or more of the illegal scheme. It seems only
proper that one who was at least half responsible for a wrong should
7
not recover for it. '
A criticism that may be raised at this point is somewhat pedantic:
comparative negligence is limited, by its terms, to negligence, but
antitrust violations are intentional. To complete the analogy to tort
law, intentional torts should provide the model for antitrust violations. Since contributory negligence is not a defense to intentional
torts, a fortiori, comparative negligence does not apply to them.7"
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971).
For those not familiar with comparative negligence in the tort field, see V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974); Timby, ComparativeNegligence, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 219 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Timbyl. In a nutshell, the concept does not bar a plaintiff who has
contributed somewhat to the injury; it reduces his damages in direct proportion to the amount
of his own negligence.
As many are aware, international admiralty law has been operating under a system of
uniform proportional liability since the Brussels Collision Liability Convention, Article 4, was
promulgated in 1910. The United States, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, never
ratified the Convention. See generally Huger, The ProportionalDamage Rule in Collisions
at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928). In maritime law, unlike in antitrust law, there is no
problem with "encouraging" or "discouraging" statutorily prohibited conduct, so the purely
proportional standard is perfectly adequate. As is discussed below, such a standard would
not suffice to fulfill antitrust policy goals.
71. Although the question of what constitutes the 50% participation may be a fine one in
some cases, it is a distinction which courts and juries will increasingly have to make. It is
suggested that if a plaintiff helped to formulate the scheme, that be deemed 50% participation.
72. Timby, supra note 70, at 223. See Note, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of
69.
70.
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Therefore, the defendant should not be allowed to use his victim's
conduct as a defense to an intentional antitrust violation.
In response to this argument, note that the intentional tort classification is not clearly appropriate when two parties voluntarily agree
to set up a business arrangement. Nevertheless, if one is comfortable
thinking in terms of intentional torts, then the plaintiff in the normal case has "consented" to the tort. To one who is willing, no
wrong is done.13 Still, as tort scholars have pointed out, the criticism
is misguided. Consent is not, strictly speaking, a defense; it negates
the existence of any tort.74 The businessman who signs a contract
"consents" to the deal offered. If he then receives what he bargained
for, we cannot in any meaningful sense say that he is the victim of
an intentional tort.
Under the proposed plan, if the plaintiff was less than a 50%
participant, he would be allowed to recover damages, reduced by his
proportionate participation. Hence, if a plaintiff is 30% responsible
for a scheme, he could recover only 70% of his damages. Similarly,
a plaintiff should be able to obtain some contribution right to protect himself from third-party claims arising out of the illegality.
Here again, the percentage of contribution would be tied to the
percentage of illegality attributable to the plaintiff.
Thus far, the proposal should cause no great concern. It simply
applies equitable tort rules in an antitrust context.75 To make the
system operate fairly, however, one more change is required. As
previously discussed, the present treble damage remedy has the
perverse consequence of preserving antitrust violations. To eliminate the incentive for delaying suit, a co-conspirator who sues for
damages should be allowed to recover only single damages.76 An
exception would be allowed in instances where coercion is present.
In such cases, the plaintiff might be found to have not
"participated" in the scheme, and hence be entitled to ordinary
treble damages. Alternatively, a court might award punitive damages where plaintiff's involvement is partially due to defendant's
Risk-The Case for Their Merger, 56 MINN. L. REv. 47, 64-65 (1971).
73. Volenti non fit injuria, to those who prefer the Latin. See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (3d ed. 1964).
74. Id.
75. As will be discussed below, I feel that these rules can be applied by courts without
legislative action.
76. The damages should be reduced, as discussed above, by the plaintiff's proportionate
responsibility for the scheme.
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coercion. Finally, to eliminate totally the incentive for delay, courts
should explicitly consider the time lag between when plaintiff knew
or should have known of the illegality and the time suit was commenced. Thus, if plaintiff knew or should have known that the
arrangement was illegal at the time he entered into it, he should
not be allowed to recover damages."
When plaintiff's cause of action and damage claims are restructured as suggested, it is still fair to allow attorney's fees to be recovered. Fees should be awarded, however, only where plaintiff is
permitted to recover damages and not where he is barred from recovery because he is found 50% or more responsible for the illegality.78 This structure encourages the more "innocent" plaintiff to
bring suit promptly upon discovery of the antitrust violation. It
eliminates, to a great degree, the absurdity of rewarding guilty parties both for their initial guilt and for perpetuating antitrust violations. It also preserves an incentive to enforce the antitrust laws for
private parties who are not totally blameless.
It may be suggested that this proposal cannot be implemented
without congressional action and is therefore somewhat utopian.
Although congressional help would be welcome, the courts created
this predicament, and should be able to resolve it. The threshold
question to whether the courts can adopt a comparative fault criterion19 is when does a plaintiff's conduct constitute a defense. As
noted, ° the courts are currently modifying and refining the level at
which plaintiff's involvement bars his suit. The Supreme Court's
statement in Perma Life that "[plaintiff's] understandable attempt to make the best of a bad situation should not be a ground
for completely denying him the right to recover. .. 81 supports the
77. This is almost directly an assumption of risk defense at this stage, and should apply
without regard to whether plaintiff helped formulate the scheme.
78. Whether attorney's fees should be allowed in the situation where plaintiff only seeks
to terminate the arrangement, or to defend a suit based upon it, presents special problems.
In such a case, there is no need for the comparative responsibility determination central to
the damage action. It would seem preferable to allow fees only where the plaintiff is using
the illegality as a shield in a suit based upon the arrangement. It seems fair to make such a
defense costless, where it prevails, and to do so would not appear to encourage lawsuits. The
latter consideration compels rejection of attorney's fees in a suit merely to terminate the
arrangement. Such suits should be discouraged, in favor of prompt informal termination.
79. In the tort field, jurisdictions have begun to adopt comparative negligence by judicial
decision. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
80. See notes 24-56 and accompanying text supra.
81. 392 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).
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proposition that courts have the power to determine a sliding scale
of partial bars based on plaintiffs conduct.
Furthermore, the "50% or more" criterion as a total bar to the
cause of action should cause only slight concern. Since Perma Life,
the lower courts have struggled to determine what the Supreme
Court meant by saying that plaintiff could be barred if he aggressively supported and furthered the scheme.82 Even a court that believes the treble damages issue is more properly left to the legislature could accept the "50% or more" rule as a quantitative definition of the aggressive support and furtherance sufficient to constitute a bar. The test itself is judicially created, and assuming the
court has the power to create the test, a fortiori, the court has the
power to refine the test.
A more serious obstacle to implementing this proposal through
court action alone is how to limit recovery to single damages where
the plaintiff contributed to the scheme. The antitrust statutes provide only for treble damages for a private plaintiff. 3 To resolve this
point, we must step back and reexamine the basis for allowing a coconspirator to sue for antitrust violations: the plaintiff is acting as
a private attorney general. 4 In effect, plaintiff has been deputized
by the courts to stand in the shoes of the government for the purpose
of bringing suit to deter and eliminate antitrust violations. Yet when
the government sues for damages, only its actual damages, without
trebling, are awarded."
Currently, a plaintiff can act as both a surrogate government
attorney and an aggrieved private party. It should not be beyond the
82. See notes 37-56 and accompanying text supra.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
84. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text supra.
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970). The entire concept of mandatory treble damages has
come into criticism recently. Professor Donald Turner, in a Symposium held on January 14,
1976 on Private Enforcement of Antimerger Laws, said:
One specific thing I would do is eliminate mandatory treble damages. They ought
to be made discretionary with the judge, and should be granted only for the so-called
per se offenses-the clear willful violation. It seems to me that when you get into the
foggy areas of the law-mergers, requirements contracts, joint ventures and the
like-where the question of legality or illegality is often very close and depends on a
lot of economic evidence usually in conflict, it is just desperately unfair to saddle
defendants with treble damages. Treble damages should be made discretionary. I think
that alone would be a very healthy development which would take a lot of pressure off
the problem here.
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT: THE
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION VII OF THE CLAYTON ACT POLICY AND LAW 104 (1977).
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power of the courts to adjust this dual role which the courts themselves created. The plaintiff who is only able to sue in a surrogate
governmental capacity, that is, an antitrust plaintiff who contributed to the scheme, should be allowed to recover only that measure
of damages which the government could collect.
This approach is fully consistent with the private attorney general
concept. The antitrust laws were meant to protect innocent, injured
parties. Clearly, co-conspirators are not within that class. However,
we allow them to sue in order to see that the law is enforced-to
supplement government efforts. By allowing at most single damages, we preserve the incentive but also take into account the policies of not encouraging violations or rewarding malefactors. A wise
and prudent court could adopt in its entirety the proposal set forth
here. Fairness, logic, and justice recommend it. The courts are responsible for the current untenable situation, and it is only fitting
that they now rectify it.

